Media reform stalled in the slow lane
Soft Censorship in Serbia

2015 UPDATE
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WAN-IFRA
96 bis, Rue Beaubourg
75003 Paris, France
www.wan-ifra.org

WAN-IFRA CEO:
Vincent Peyrègne

PROJECT MANAGER:
Mariona Sanz Cortell

PRINCIPAL RESEARCHER:
Tanja Maksic
BIRN Serbia

EDITOR:
Thomas R. Lansner

RESEARCH PARTNERS:
Center for International Media Assistance
National Endowment for Democracy
1025 F Street, N.W., 8th Floor
Washington, DC 20004, USA
www.cima.ned.org

Open Society Justice Initiative
224 West 57th Street
New York, New York 10019, USA
www.opensocietyfoundations.org

RESEARCH PARTNER SERBIA:
Balkan Investigative Reporting Network BIRN Serbia
Gospodar Jevremova 47/3
11000 Belgrade, Serbia
URL: http://birn.eu.com

SUPPORTED BY:
Open Society Foundations

DESIGN AND PREPRESS:
Snezana Vukmirovic, Ivan Cosic, Plain&Hill Serbia

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ABOUT THIS UPDATE:

This report, prepared by Tanja Maksic in cooperation with the BIRN Serbia team, updates the January 2014 report, “Soft Censorship: Strangling Serbia’s Media”. It is one of a series in the ongoing project on soft censorship around the world led by the World Association of Newspapers and News Publishers (WAN-IFRA) and the Center for International Media Assistance (CIMA). Country reports on Hungary, Malaysia, Mexico and Serbia were issued in 2014, as well as a global overview, “Soft Censorship, Hard Impact”, written by Thomas R Lansner, who also edited this update and is general editor for the series.

The Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN) is a group of editors and trainers that enables journalists in the region to produce in-depth analytical and investigative journalism on complex political, economic and social themes. Operating in the field of media development and good governance, BIRN Serbia’s mission is to advance the country’s political, social and economic transition through the provision of objective and quality information, the training of journalists, and assistance to institutional reforms.
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1. Executive Summary

“Soft Censorship: Strangling Serbia’s Media”, released in January 2014, described how Serbian officials were systematically obstructing urgently needed media sector reforms, especially in state funding of media outlets.\(^2\)

Eighteen months later, these delays persist, and undemocratic practices in the media sector continue unchecked. This update finds a further and sharp decline in media freedoms in Serbia, and offers recommendations to counter this trend. Small improvements to the legal framework are noted, but even these are not yet fully implemented. Privatization of state media assets has stalled.

Serbia today lacks a functional, vital, and competitive media market. Taxpayer funds are now one of the most important sources for survival of media outlets. However, public monies are deployed with partisan intent. The Serbian Government’s “soft censorship” exploits media outlets’ financial vulnerability to influence news coverage and shape the broader media landscape.

Soft censorship is an indirect and often highly effective media control mechanism that diminishes journalistic independence, constrains freedom of expression, and narrows democratic debate. WAN-IFRA and CIMA define soft censorship as “the array of official actions intended to influence media output, short of legal or extra-legal bans, direct censorship of specific content, or physical attacks on media outlets or media practitioners.”\(^3\) These indirect forms of censorship include selective media subsidies and partisan allocation of advertising, as well as biased application of regulatory and licensing powers that can influence editorial content and affect media outlets’ viability.

This updated analysis reviews a range of soft censorship tools deployed by Serbian authorities to reward government supporters and punish its critics. These include: biased subsidies to media outlets, selective government advertising, public enterprises contracting directly with media outlets absent competition or monitoring, regulatory manipulation regarding licensing and ownership transparency, and differing treatment of tax obligations and covering loans and debts of media close to government.

The research covers government entities at national and local level, as well as public companies (companies owned or controlled by the state). Information presented in this report relies mostly on budgetary data collected by BIRN Serbia over the past several years, with special attention to 2012 and 2013 fiscal data gathered using the provisions of the Freedom of Information Law.\(^4\) The research sample includes all ministries of the national government, 33 local self-governments, 34 national public companies (along with their branch offices), and 20 national agencies with public authorities. Please see a list of these entities in Annex A.

The report is built on empirical evidence. Documentary research included the study of: laws and government documents; budgetary data; data extracted from media registers and media market reports, regulatory bodies and independent bodies; and research done by specialists in NGOs, international organizations, and academia.

As the previous Serbia soft censorship report observed, public data regarding state funding to media and state advertising budgets are often sparse and incomplete. The lack of transparency and record keeping remains a severe challenge in assessing the full extent and impact of soft censorship in Serbia.
2. Media Environment Overview

Several media watchdog groups have noted serious deterioration of media freedom in Serbia that threatens the country’s democratic prospects. Serbia dropped 13 places in Reporters without Borders 2014 Index. A similar negative trend was described by Amnesty International and Freedom House. The IREX 2014 Media Sustainability Index recorded developments in the Serbian media sector as “generally unfavourable,” warning that “stagnation and declining standards” threaten Serbian media.

These reports note that media outlets or individual journalists are occasionally targeted by direct harassment from government or other political actors. However, the entire media sector faces increasingly difficult economic conditions, and the small, poor, and saturated media market is an easy target for soft censorship. Government use of financial means to favour or punish media obstructs fair market operations. Competition for shrinking advertising and audiences is increasing, opening media to greater political influence by large advertisers, notably public bodies.

The European Commission also expressed “concerns about deteriorating conditions for the full exercise of freedom of expression in Serbia” in its 2014 Progress Report on Serbia’s proposed EU membership, emphasizing the importance of freedom of expression in the accession process. The report points to “a growing trend of self-censorship which, combined with undue influence on editorial policies, and a series of cases of intervention against websites, are detrimental to freedom of the media and adversely affect the development of professional and investigative journalism.”

This crisis of the journalistic profession and concern regarding media freedoms are further described in “Media Integrity Matters”, a study by the South Eastern Europe Media Observatory Project (2014). “There is a general trend towards commercialisation and tabloidization of journalism and a lower credibility of news media,” the report says. “News content, in-depth and investigative reporting, diversity of opinion, coverage of controversial topics, and respect for ethical standards have all been on the decline.”

Journalists face diverse pressures. Their work is often only modestly paid, highly stressful, and affected by lack of resources, insufficient knowledge to cover certain topics, and uneven editorial ethical standards. Investigative journalism is not encouraged; work that reveals abuse of power and public resources is often obstructed. Senior public officials sometimes publicly denounce and seek to intimidate investigative journalists.

In February 2015, the Anti-Corruption Council of the Government of the Republic of Serbia issued an analysis detailing various means of media control in the 2011-2014 period. It found that over these years, political parties continued to misuse their influence and public resources to “discipline” media, editors and journalists. Hidden or direct media control is based on budgetary means and other public sources of financing, the Council found, and is done regularly at all levels of the government.

Hopes that new media laws enacted in August 2014—based on the 2011 Serbian Media Strategy—would launch a wave of media sector reforms remain unrealized. Serbia’s Parlia-
The government adopted legislation on public information and media,\textsuperscript{15} on electronic media,\textsuperscript{16} and public services,\textsuperscript{17} as part of a package of 2014 media laws. The most significant change (embodied clearly in the new Law on Public Information and Media) regulates financial relations between state and media. Starting from 2015, authorities at all three levels of government—republic, provincial and local—are permitted to spend money aimed to support content production only through public competitions.

Article 15 of the Law on Public Information and Media defines the right of citizens to be “truthfully, impartially, timely, and fully informed” as a “public interest”. The same law’s Articles 17 to 26 detail application procedures for the co-financing of projects, including the right and conditions to participate in the competition, composition and work of the selection committees, and criteria for project selection. It also stipulates the obligation of “the Republic of Serbia, autonomous provinces or unit of local self-government to provide the funds from the budget for the realization of public interest in the field of public information”, as well as the obligations of these state bodies to supervise the bidding process and proper utilization of budgetary money.

These laws provide a sound basis for crucial changes in the relationship between the Serbian state and the country’s media. However, they are enforced partially and inconsistently. As highlighted in the January 2014 Serbia soft censorship report, Serbia’s improved legal framework is meaningless if applied selectively, and if contraventions are unpunished. The government’s failure to privatize state media is one example. The Media Coalition of five professional media organisations\textsuperscript{18} points to others. Since the new laws came into force, it has issued several public statements warning of breaches in their application by more than 30 local self-governments, noting that only 67 of 167 municipalities in Serbia has had open calls for co-financing media content production.\textsuperscript{19}

**Country profile**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Serbia Country Data</th>
<th>2014</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>7.13 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adult literacy</td>
<td>98%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross national income per capita</td>
<td>5,820 USD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban/rural population</td>
<td>58 / 42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile phone subscription (SIM)</td>
<td>119%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internet Access (homes)</td>
<td>47.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corruption perception index</td>
<td>41/100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: UN, World Bank, ITU, Transparency International, Statistical Office of Serbia
3. Key Findings

- State media sector spending does not promote media independence or pluralism. It is most often used to support survival of state-owned media, or to support media favourable to the government. Heavy reliance on money from state bodies and public companies inhibits media ability to perform their watchdog role, and to provide proper oversight and independent monitoring of those who are financing them.

- Legal mechanisms that could ensure fair and equitable access to public resources by all media are now in place, including media privatization, but are not fully applied due to political interference.

- In a small, poor, and oversaturated market, media compete for scarce advertising and often rely on state funding to secure survival, compromising their independence. State bodies, as well as state companies at all levels, are leveraging media sector spending to influence media content and viability. This is done—sometimes quite explicitly—through contracts and cooperation with media outlets, or via marketing agencies that place government advertisements.

- State media sector spending is not allocated on competitive bases and is not accessible to all media on equal terms. BIRN Serbia has detected four main models of budgetary allocations: subsidies and directly negotiated contracts are than 80 per cent of all spending, while public procurements and public competitions, the only allocations that require some competition, comprise 20 per cent of all funds.

- State-owned companies are one of the most lucrative and most opaque sources of financing, particularly for local media.

- There are no official, consolidated data on government spending in the media sector, nor publicly available reports on the effects and results of these allocations. Lack of transparency allows uncontrolled discretionary spending that is a primary enabler of soft censorship.
4. Key Recommendations

- State media sector spending should be used primarily to foster media pluralism, support creation of quality content, and help media exercise their watchdog role.

- State funding should not interfere with fair market competition. Several laws, including the Law on State Aid and the Law on Budget prohibit this. Properly exercised open calls for advertising and participation in other state funded media activities can increase competitiveness in the media market by awarding funds to media outlets with demonstrated capacity to reach specified target audiences.

- Newly adopted media laws should be fully implemented to provide solid legal bases for exercising freedom of expression. The Law on Public Information and Media should be applied without exception, introducing new standards in budgetary allocation with clear procedures, criteria, and conditions for allocation of state funds. All state bodies whose budgets include media spending should detail such activities in publicly available annual reports.

- Direct financing of media outlets without transparent processes must end, as provided by the new laws. After the privatization process, subsidies will end. Until then, subsidies should be allocated through open calls on a competitive basis, with results publically reported in a timely manner.

- All relevant laws (such as the Law on Advertising, the Law on Public Procurements and the Law on State Aid) should be amended to conform to media-related laws. They should provide clear input on regulation of media services and state advertising.

- Media outlets, professional organisations and other relevant stakeholders should be included in early stages of budgetary planning processes to allow transparency and public knowledge that are crucial to curbing unjustified of partisan public funding to media.

- The Serbian public should be given access to data to make informed choices about their media consumption. Data concerning media ownership structures and the use of taxpayer funds is of particular importance.
5. Soft Censorship Practices: Overview

5.1 Subsidies

Subsidies are the dominant instrument for allocation of state money, and are granted to media outlets still owned by national, provincial or local institutions. This financing reflects Serbia’s unfinished process of media privatization, which has been delayed for over a decade. About 90 publicly owned media outlets remain listed by the Agency for Privatization.

According to the report “Media integrity matters, reclaiming public service value in media and journalism” (South East European Media Observatory, 2014), “State funding of media in Serbia is unregulated, unmonitored, and non-transparent. The largest part of state financial aid is allocated arbitrarily, i.e. on political grounds, and without supervision.”

Such aid can grossly distort fair media market competition. BIRN Serbia’s research shows that in 2013 more than 60 per cent of all spending by 33 local self-governments in the media sector was allocated to 43 media outlets owned by the state, with the rest divided among 271 privately owned media. The same pattern applies for spending at the national level. BIRN Serbia mapped RSD 1.5 billion (approximately EUR 12.5 million) of media spending by ministries, national agencies, and public companies in 2012 and 2013. Almost half of that money was given to just four state-owned media (the news agency Tanjug, Radio Serbia, and the newspapers Panorama and Jugoslovenski Pregled); the other half was divided among more than 500 other recipients.

Media reform legislation, principally the August 2014 Law on Public Information and Media planned completion of media privatization by July 1, 2015. Yet the political grip on media is still strong. The latest government decision extends the privatization process until at least the end of October 2015, and the pro-government and partly state-owned daily Politika will be exempt from privatization for another year by special decree. As described in the discussion paper “Media Freedom and Integrity in the Western Balkans” (European Fund for the Balkans, 2015), “the temptation is great” for those in power to retain means to pressure the media in pursuit of their political agendas.

5.2 Advertising and self-promotion

The majority of state aid to media beside subsidies is used for advertising and self-promotion by state bodies and public companies. There is a clear and proper need for governments to share important information with the public; public health campaigns are an example. Public campaigns organized by marketing agencies and regular coverage of the work of state bodies or public companies are two main modes of advertising that incorporate significant political influence. Applying these on a partisan basis can reduce the effectiveness of such communications, as well as distort the media market.
Due to inconsistencies in the Law on Advertising, media are expected to disseminate information selected and/or created by government bodies, while at the same time reporting impartially on them. For example, the regional broadcaster RTV Kraljevo signed a contract for media coverage in 2013 with the local government that obligated it to provide “prime time” space “without delay” for the participation of the local government representatives in their programmes “after the receipt of written request”. This is typical of contracts that media outlets sign with local governments, where a precondition for cooperation is the “regular media coverage” of the work of local government bodies, local institutions and public companies. This inhibits media’s watchdog role, as any critical reporting or unbiased monitoring might be “punished” by suspension of funding.

State-owned companies also seek to shape media coverage. The thermal power plant Nikola Tesla signed contracts with local media RTV Mag and TV Gem that set precise times and length of coverage: “Procurement of the time for broadcasting of TV programs, development, production and co-production of TV programs on TV Mag Obrenovac annually in the show ‘Postcard’, 20 minutes per month x 12 months; the show ‘Obrenovac today’, 60 minutes per month x 12 months,” etc. Another contract, between the public electricity company Elektro-distribucija Cacak (part of Elektrosrbija, Kraljevo) and local media stipulated: “The cooperation of service providers and advertisers for broadcasting of announcements, advertisements and other important messages, at the request of the advertiser in regular programs of the service providers, and informing the citizens about the activities of Elektro-distribucija Cacak.” Such contracts are usually directly negotiated with media, opaquely and absent any public procurement procedure.

Another lucrative source of revenue for media is participation in public campaigns that are directed by advertising agencies using state funds. Despite being managed by private companies, the process is tainted by political interference. In Serbia, owners of the leading marketing agencies that place advertising are close to the current government; media outlets not friendly to the government receive much less advertising. In many instances, this leads to self-censorship that almost invisibly embeds political influence over media. The fortunes of advertising agencies seems closely aligned to political shifts. In 2012 elections, the Democratic Party lost power and the Serbian Progressive Party gained a parliamentary majority and leadership of government. Direct Media, an advertising agency close to the leader of the Democrats, at that time controlled over 70 per cent of the advertising market, but quickly lost clients. The Block and Roll agency, owned by a close friend of Prime Minister Aleksandar Vucic, swiftly acquired significant market share.
5.3 Other Administrative and Regulatory Pressures

Besides the two main mechanisms of financial pressure described above, state bodies have at their disposal a range of other instruments to shape Serbia’s media sector. A profound lack of transparency allows partisan allocation of licenses, masking ownership status and media concentration. In its 2015 report (Chapter 2.3), the Anti-Corruption Council of the Government of the Republic of Serbia analysed transparency of ownership of 50 media outlets in Serbia (including BIRN, Center for Investigative Journalism and Juzne vesti as investigative online platforms). It found that only 23 media outlets have made their ownership structure public, while 27 media outlets have non-transparent or partially transparent ownership, the latter in cases where owners are formally known, but others operationally manage the outlets. For example, the Council singled out hidden joint ownership of the national broadcasters TV Prva and TV B92, both part of Greek Antenna Group.

This concentration is unlawful in Serbia, yet tolerated by the Authority of Electronic Media and the Ministry of Culture and Information. The Council also documented: hidden ownership of another national broadcaster TV Happy, connected to Serbian businessman Predrag Rankovic Peconi; of regional broadcaster RTV Panonija being governed by people close to United Regions political party; and of local media TV Plus from Krusevac and TV Zona from Nis run by family members of Minister of Defense and senior of Serbian Progressives Party official Bratislav Gasic. No state institutions reacted to the Council’s findings.

Lack of ownership transparency is partly caused by absence of proper registration whereby media outlets are obliged to report on ownership status or money received from state funds. The Serbian Business Registry will be in charge of setting up and maintaining the new media outlet register, in accordance with the new Law on Media and Public Information and its by-laws. The re-registration process is due to be completed in September 2015.

Apart from licensing, favoritism in tax collection serves as additional instrument for punishing or rewarding media. In September 2014, the Tax Office released a list of the country’s biggest tax debtors, with the Pink Media Group, owner of the national broadcaster RTV Pink, among the top 25. RTV Pink is very supportive of the government, and was permitted to postpone payment of almost EUR 5 million of tax obligations for six months, until February 2015. Treatment of the small, independent newspaper Kikindske novine, famous for its critical attitude towards local and national government, was markedly different. Its accounts were blocked for six months by Tax Office, due to a far smaller tax debt of approximately EUR 2500.
6. Conclusion

Despite new governmental leadership since April 2014, Serbia’s political parties appear as unwilling as ever to relinquish their formal control—or informal influence through various forms of soft censorship—on media ownership and media editorial policy and content.

In the still only partially privatized media market, most Serbian media is financially unsustainable, and thus prone to political and economic pressures. State institutions and state-owned companies that are the media sector’s most important financial sources often engage in unlawful operations that distort competition and create a dysfunctional market. Partisan allocation of government advertising, subsidies and licenses, and unequal tax treatment are among the soft censorship mechanisms used by the authorities to influence editorial content.

The Serbian government has taken several formal actions to begin implementation of the 2011 Media Strategy, and to improve the legal framework for the media sector in compliance with EU standards. Yet legislative efforts will not suffice if the government fails to fully respect these regulations. Delays in the media privatization process discussed above are an example.

State spending in Serbia’s media sector requires fundamental and urgent reform to ensure that taxpayers’ money is no longer used to impose soft censorship—and instead to offer public information through free, independent and pluralistic media that facilitates informed democratic participation. Without this, Serbian media faces further stagnation and decay, and Serbia’s democracy an uncertain future.
Endnotes


2. The report offered five recommendations:
   • All state funding for media development and support should be paid into a common media assistance fund supervised by an independent and nonpartisan commission.
   • All state funding for media development and support should be allocated in public competitions on principles of transparent and non-discriminatory state aid under equal conditions for all media.
   • State assistance to media outlets should focus on project finance and particularly on co-financing news programs. Crucially, all contracts signed with media outlets should include provisions explicitly barring authorities from interfering with editorial content.
   • Revision of the Advertising Act should provide significant penalties for state bodies and officials who violate prohibitions on using public funds to promote individual or partisan political interests.
   • The 2011 Public Information System Development Strategy (the “Media Strategy”) recommendations, including creation of “non-discriminatory conditions for healthy competition in the media industry,” should be enacted as very soon as feasible.

3. Various types of soft censorship are all potentially debilitating to free and independent media. The 2014 WAN-IFRA/CIMA report Soft Censorship, Hard Impact focuses primarily on financial aspects of official soft censorship: pressures to influence news coverage through biased, and/or no transparent allocation or withholding of state/government media subsidies, advertising, and similar financial instruments. Soft censorship can evoke pervasive self-censorship that restricts reporting while maintaining the appearance of media freedom.

4. Beyond the scope of the investigations detailed here are myriad forms of unofficial indirect censorship that may affect media output. These may rise from cultural, religious, or other social norms and traditions, or adherence to societal narratives that influence institutional and individual reporting, and which might be promoted or imposed by a variety of non-state actors.

5. Law on Free Access to Information of Public Importance, Official Gazette of Republic of Serbia, no. 120/04, 54/07, 104/09 and 36/10.


10. The Independent Journalists’ Association of Serbia (IJAS) recorded more than 20 cases of physical and verbal attacks and threats in 2014, while six new court proceedings have been initiated against journalists. IJAS has developed two data bases where such attacks are recorded, available in Serbian: http://www.bazenuns.rs/srpski/napadi-na-novinare.

11. There are currently over 1440 media outlets in Serbia, according to the Serbian Business Registers Agency. All are competing for a share of a diminishing media advertising market, which was worth approximately EUR 155 million in 2013-2014, falling from EUR 170 million in 2011-2012.


14. After a series of investigations into Government’s work, BIRN Serbia has come under the pressure from Prime Minister Vucic and media close to his administration. More information on this attack are available here: http://birn.eu.com/en/page/birn-under-fire.


19. The Independent Journalists’ Association of Serbia, the Journalists’ Association of Serbia, the Association of Independent Electronic Media, the Journalists’ Association of Vojvodina, and the Local Press.

20. Media Coalition public statements (in Serbian) are available here: http://nuns.org.rs/sr/search/tagStories.html?tagId=64.

21. List of all media outlets to be privatized is available here: http://www.priv.rs/Agencija+za+privatizaciju/101/Preduzece.shtml?keyword=status+portfolio_id=20/metod_id=/prodato=/okrug_id=-1/pr_status_id=1/osnovna_id=10/maticni_broj=/naselje=/document=/delatnost_id=1/representative=/limit=20/start-from=10/sortby=delatnost/ascdesc=ASC/image_value_user_sess=87c7d115c4df840d4ea4de5a86108ebc/submit=Pretra%C5%BEiva%C4%8D.


24. Law on Advertising (Official Gazette of Republic of Serbia, no. 79/2005 and 83/2014), Chapter VI, Article 86, prescribes specific situations when state advertising is allowed, for example, elections, humanitarian aid, natural disasters or certain economic activities. Legislation, however, did not specify scope, nor the number of permitted ad units or the method of selecting the media where advertising is placed; nor are there criteria for selection of advertising content or auditing of funds spent for these purposes.

25. BIRN Serbia described this mechanism of influence in an investigative article that was awarded a national journalistic prize in 2014, available (in Serbian) here: http://javno.rs/istrazivanja/oglasavanje-kao-privatni-posao-vlasti.


### ANNEX

#### RESEARCH SAMPLE

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENTS</th>
<th>MINISTRIES</th>
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<td>Office for Cooperation with the Diaspora and Serbs in the Region; Ministry of Economy and Regional Development; Ministry of Finance; The Ministry of Finance and Economy; Ministry of Culture and Information; Ministry of Culture, Media and Information Society; The Ministry of Defence; Ministry of Youth and Sports; Ministry of Agriculture, Trade, Forestry and Water Management; Ministry of Justice and Public Administration; Ministry of Natural Resources, Mining and Spatial Planning; Ministry of Economy; Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development; Ministry of Regional Development and Local Self-Government; Ministry of Transport; The Ministry of Foreign and Internal Trade and Telecommunications; Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Ministry of Interior; The Ministry of Religion and Diaspora; The Ministry for Human and Minority Rights, Public Administration and Local Self-Government; Ministry of Health; Ministry of Environment, Mining and Spatial Planning</td>
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<th>NATIONAL AGENCIES</th>
<th>STATE-OWNED COMPANIES</th>
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<td>Agency for Accreditation of Health Care Institutions; Traffic Safety Agency; Energy Agency; The Agency for Medicines and Medical Devices; Agency for Bankruptcy Supervision; Deposit Insurance Agency; Privatization Agency; Business Registers Agency; Serbia Investment and Export Promotion Agency - SIEPA; The Agency for Environmental Protection; Anti-Doping Agency; Security - Information Agency; National Agency for Regional Development; Republic Agency for peaceful settlement of labour disputes; Republic Agency for housing; Military Security Agency</td>
<td>AirSerbia Catering Belgrade; ED &quot;Center&quot; Kragujevac - Branch ED &quot;Elektromorava&quot;, Pozarevac; ED &quot;Center&quot; Kragujevac - Branch ED &quot;Elektromorava&quot;, Smederevo; ED &quot;Center&quot; Kragujevac - Branch ED &quot;Elektrosumadija&quot;, Kragujevac; ED &quot;Center&quot; Kragujevac - Management; Elektrosrbija Kraljevo, Arandjelovac ED; Elektrosrbija Kraljevo, Cacak ED; Elektrosrbija Kraljevo, ED Cuprija; Elektrosrbija Kraljevo, ED Jagodina; Elektrosrbija ED Kraljevo; Elektrosrbija Kraljevo, Krusevac ED; Elektrosrbija Kraljevo, ED Lazarevac; Elektrosrbija Kraljevo, Loznica ED; Elektrosrbija Kraljevo, Novi Pazar ED; Elektrosrbija Kraljevo, Sabac ED; Elektrosrbija Kraljevo, ED Trstenik; Elektrosrbija Kraljevo, Uzice ED; Elektrosrbija Kraljevo, Valjevo ED; Elektrosrbija Kraljevo, ED Vrnjaska Banja; HIP Petrochemical; Jat apartments Kopaonik; PE Electronetwork Serbia; PE Electricity Serbia; PE Broadcasting Equipment and Communications; PE Hydro power plant &quot;Djerdap&quot;; PE Jugoimport - SDPR; PE Corridors of Serbia; PE Mail Serbia; PE Official Gazette; PE Stara Planina; Transnafta; Aerodrom Nikola Tesla; PE National Park &quot;Djerdap&quot;; PE National Park &quot;Tara&quot;; PE for shelters; PIU Research and Development; KSR Beogradturs; RB Kolubara; Srbijavode; Serbian banks; Thermal power plant Nikola Tesla</td>
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